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In order to better understand the functional contribution of resting state activity to con-
scious cognition, we aimed to review increases and decreases in functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) functional connectivity under physiological (sleep), pharmaco-
logical (anesthesia), and pathological altered states of consciousness, such as brain death,
coma, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, and minimally conscious
state.The reviewed resting state networks were the DMN, left and right executive control,
salience, sensorimotor, auditory, and visual networks. We highlight some methodologi-
cal issues concerning resting state analyses in severely injured brains mainly in terms
of hypothesis-driven seed-based correlation analysis and data-driven independent com-
ponents analysis approaches. Finally, we attempt to contextualize our discussion within
theoretical frameworks of conscious processes.We think that this “lesion” approach allows
us to better determine the necessary conditions under which normal conscious cognition
takes place. At the clinical level, we acknowledge the technical merits of the resting state
paradigm. Indeed, fast and easy acquisitions are preferable to activation paradigms in clin-
ical populations. Finally, we emphasize the need to validate the diagnostic and prognostic
value of fMRI resting state measurements in non-communicating brain damaged patients.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past decades, neuroimaging research has been focusing on
studying brain function in “resting” conditions, when subjects
receive no external stimulation. Functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) resting state connectivity studies stress that the
brain at rest is characterized by coherent fluctuations in the blood-
oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal. These BOLD fluctuations
can be detected in the low frequency range (<0.1 Hz; Cordes et al.,
2001), they are distinct from respiratory and cardiovascular sig-
nal contribution (De Luca et al., 2006) and organize the brain in
large-scale cerebral networks (Damoiseaux et al., 2006). The most
widely studied resting state network (RSN) is the default mode net-
work (DMN), encompassing precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC), mesiofrontal/anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and tem-
poroparietal junction areas (Figure 1). This network of areas was
initially identified in positron emission tomography (PET) stud-
ies as regions less active when performance on cognitive tasks was
compared to resting control condition, such as eye fixation or eyes
closed (Shulman et al., 1997; Mazoyer et al., 2001). Later, the DMN
was also identified in fMRI and in terms of cognitive function,
its activity has been linked to self-related and internal processes,
such as stimulus-independent thoughts (McKiernan et al., 2006),
mind-wandering (Mason et al., 2007), social cognition (Schilbach
et al., 2008), introspection (Goldberg et al., 2006), monitoring of
the “mental self” (Lou et al., 2004), and integration of cognitive
processes (Greicius et al., 2003). Interestingly, areas of the DMN
can be assigned to specific cognitive functions, for example the
PCC seems to be important in autobiographical memory while
the frontal areas may be important for self-reference (Whitfield-
Gabrieli et al., 2011). In that respect, resting state acquisitions
can, at least to a certain degree, be informative of cognitive func-
tion. Importantly for clinical studies, the resting state paradigm
is particularly appealing because it does not require sophisticated
experimental setup to administer external stimuli and surpasses
the need for patients’ contribution (e.g., language comprehen-
sion and/or production or motor responses; Soddu et al., 2011).
Hence, resting state protocols are a suitable means to study clinical
populations, in which communication cannot be established at
the bedside, such as patients with disorders of consciousness [e.g.,
coma,“vegetative state (VS)”/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome
(UWS), minimally conscious state (MCS)]. It has been suggested
that resting state analyses can be used in a clinical setting to identify
group differences, to obtain patient-specific diagnostic and prog-
nostic information, to perform longitudinal studies and monitor
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FIGURE 1 | Multiple cerebral networks can be identified with
fMRI in healthy controls (n=10) during normal wakeful resting
state using independent component analysis. These networks
reflect “higher-order” cognitive (i.e., default mode, left and right
executive control, salience networks), and “lower-order”
sensorimotor, and sensory (auditory, visual) function. For illustrative
purposes, group-level spatial maps (z values) are rendered on a
structural T1 magnetic resonance template and x, y, and z values
indicate the Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates of the
represented sections.
treatment effects, to cluster heterogeneous diseases such as schizo-
phrenia or even to guide treatments, such as surgical interventions
(Fox and Greicius, 2010).
With an aim to better determine the functional role of rest-
ing state activity in healthy conditions and to further comprehend
its contribution to clinical states, the present review will adopt a
“lesion” approach. Indeed, patients’ neurological data can give us
information about the functional role of the resting state activity to
consciousness. We will review changes in functional connectivity
in the DMN under physiological (sleep, hypnosis), pharmacolog-
ical (sedation, anesthesia), and pathological (coma-related states)
alteration of consciousness. The functional contribution of the
anticorrelated activity between DMN and the “extrinsic” system
to (un)conscious states will also be discussed. We will further
focus on functional connectivity changes in multiple RSNs, such
as the bilateral executive control, salience, sensorimotor, audi-
tory, and visual networks (Beckmann et al., 2005; Damoiseaux
et al., 2006; De Luca et al., 2006; Fox and Raichle, 2007; Smith
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et al., 2009). With regards to resting state assessments of severely
brain-injured patients, we will highlight some methodological
issues mainly in terms of hypothesis-driven seed-based correla-
tion analysis and data-driven independent components analysis.
Finally, we will attempt to contextualize our discussion within
theoretical frameworks around conscious processes.
(UN)CONSCIOUS STATES AND RESTING STATE DEFAULT
MODE NETWORK ACTIVITY
To date, there is no universal definition for consciousness cover-
ing all its essential characteristics (Zeman, 2001). Here, we define
consciousness in an operational way based on clinical practice,
stressing that consciousness can be reduced to two components,
arousal and awareness (Posner et al., 2007). Arousal refers to the
level of alertness and it is clinically evidenced by eyes opening.
Awareness refers to the content of consciousness and it is clini-
cally evidenced by command following or by observing non-reflex
motor behavior, such as eye tracking and localized responses to
pain (Posner et al., 2007). Sleep is the best example to describe
the relationship between these two components: the drowsier we
become as we move toward deep sleep, the less aware we get of
our surroundings and ourselves (a notorious exception is the
oneiric activity during rapid eye movement sleep during which
we remain behaviorally unconscious; Hobson and Pace-Schott,
2002). Based on this definition, subjects in pathological and phar-
macological coma (i.e., anesthesia) are not conscious because they
are not awake (American Society of Anesthesiologists Task Force
on Intraoperative Awareness, 2006). Similarly, under sedation (a
drug-dose dependent impairment of consciousness) and hypnotic
state (a suggestion-dependent alteration of conscious experience;
The Executive Committee of the American Psychological Associ-
ation – Division of Psychological Hypnosis, 1994) subjects report
an altered state of awareness as they move toward lower wakeful-
ness levels. A unique dissociation between arousal and awareness is
observed in patients in a VS (also called UWS; Laureys et al., 2010)
who recover wakefulness but their motor responses are merely
reflexive and, hence, not indicative of conscious awareness (Lau-
reys et al., 2005). Patients in VS/UWS should not be mistaken with
patients in a MCS. Patients in MCS, although unable to function-
ally communicate with their environment, do show fluctuating
remnants of willful behavior (Giacino et al., 2002). Based on the
level of their purposeful behavioral repertoire, MCS patients were
recently subcategorized as MCS+ (i.e., showing command fol-
lowing,) and MCS− (i.e., showing visual pursuit, localization of
noxious stimulation, or non-contingent behaviors, such as appro-
priate smiling or crying to emotional stimuli; Bruno et al., 2011).
This kind of clinical distinction highlights the importance of
motor output to the evaluation of consciousness. Patients with a
locked-in syndrome (LIS), however, have no means of producing
speech, limb, or facial movements but still are awake and con-
scious (Posner et al., 2007). Evidently, by solely measuring motor
responses, these patients can be mistaken for unconscious (Laureys
et al., 2005). Similarly, consciousness in patients with aphasia can
be underestimated if the clinician does not account for such deficit.
As a consequence, valid motor- and language-independent assess-
ment of residual brain function in non-communicating patients
is of both clinical and ethical importance.
The resting state paradigm surpasses the requirement for motor
output or language comprehension. To date, neuroimaging proto-
cols investigating connectivity of the DMN during resting state are
not conclusive as to its exact functional role. Nevertheless, resting
state fMRI studies suggest that activity of this network is gener-
ally reduced as a function of the level of consciousness (Table 1).
For example, it has been shown that with the advancement of
sleep, connectivity between the frontal and posterior parts of the
DMN decreases yet persists (Horovitz et al., 2009). Decreases in
functional connectivity were also observed in PCC of the DMN
under pharmacological unconsciousness with propofol (Bover-
oux et al., 2010; Schrouff et al., 2011) and sevoflurane (Martuzzi
et al., 2010). Importantly for clinical populations, connectivity in
the PCC was shown to be indistinguishable between controls and
LIS patients, relatively preserved in MCS, significantly reduced in
VS/UWS patients (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010) and could not be
identified in brain death (i.e., irreversible coma with absent brain-
stem reflexes; Boly et al., 2009). Similarly during a passive auditory
task, DMN deactivations, which are thought to interrupt ongo-
ing introspective processes, showed a reduction in MCS whereas
VS/UWS patients did not show such task-induced deactivations
(Crone et al., 2011). These studies suggest that DMN functional
connectivity correlates, at least partially, with the level of ongoing
conscious cognition. This is in agreement with functional connec-
tivity studies on intermediate states of awareness. For example, in
hypnotic state there is only relative (Demertzi et al., 2011b) or no
connectivity decreases in the DMN (McGeown et al., 2009). Sim-
ilarly, during moderate sedation, little (Greicius et al., 2008) or no
changes (Stamatakis et al., 2010) in DMN connectivity have been
observed. During light sleep there is no change (Horovitz et al.,
2008; Larson-Prior et al., 2009). Nevertheless, in deep sleep brain
activity shows increased modularity, which hinders the brain to
integrate information and therefore might account for decreased
consciousness during dreamless sleep (Boly et al., 2012).
Taken together, changes in the DMN functional connectivity
in altered consciousness states could suggest modified self-related
conscious mentation. Indeed, it has been suggested that in nor-
mal waking conditions, resting state activity in the posterior
cingulate and frontal areas accounts for self-referential thoughts
(Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011). Therefore, it could be inferred
that decreased connectivity in the DMN reflects restricted abili-
ties for self-referential processing, like in patients with disorders
of consciousness. One should keep in mind, though, that our lim-
ited understanding of the dynamic neural complexity underlying
consciousness and its resistance to quantification in the absence of
communication make it difficult to establish strong claims about
self-consciousness in non-communicating subjects.
DMN FUNCTIONAL ANTICORRELATIONS
Since the early studies of resting state, it was suggested that the
brain’s baseline activity can be organized in two brain networks
showing anticorrelated activity to each other: an “intrinsic” and
an “extrinsic” network (Fox et al., 2005; Fransson, 2005; Golland
et al., 2007; Tian et al., 2007). The “intrinsic” network coincides
with the DMN and is involved in the same cognitive processes as
the DMN. The “extrinsic” system encompasses lateral frontopari-
etal areas resembling the brain activations during goal-directed
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Table 1 | FMRI studies showing alterations in resting state functional connectivity of multiple networks in physiological (sleep, hypnosis),
pharmacological (sedation), and pathological states of unconsciousness.
N Functional connectivity change Method Study
DMN Light sleep 14 Connectivity persists Seed-based Horovitz et al. (2008)
10 Connectivity persists Seed-based Larson-Prior et al. (2009)
Slow wave sleep 14 ↑: PCC correlation with IPC.
Correlation within nodes persistent
Seed-based Horovitz et al. (2009)
↓: Correlation PCC with MPFC became
absent
25 ↓: PCC, PHG, MPFC ICA Sämann et al. (2011)
Light sedation 16 ↑: PCC and areas outside of the DMN Seed-based Stamatakis et al. (2010)
12 ↓: General deceased connectivity, focal
decreases PCC
ICA Greicius et al. (2008)
Anesthesia 20 ↓: PCC/precuneus, MPFC, superior
frontal sulci, parahippocampal gyrus,
and bilateral TPJ
Seed-based and ICA Boveroux et al. (2010)
14 ↑: PCC and STG Seed-based Martuzzi et al. (2010)
↓: PCC and adjacent areas
18 ↓: Reduction connectivity within the
DMN and between the DMN and other
networks
ICA Schrouff et al. (2011)
Hypnosis 18 ↓ right middle and superior frontal
gyrus
Seed-based McGeown et al. (2009)
12 ↑: Middle frontal and bilateral angular
gyri
ICA Demertzi et al. (2011b)
↓: PCC and bilateral parahippocampal
areas
Comatose states 2 ↓: Connectivity is absent in brain dead,
decreased PCC, and thalamus
connectivity
ICA Boly et al. (2009)
Preserved cortico-cortical connectivity
11 ↓: Connections between PCC and
MPFC
Seed-based and ICA Soddu et al. (2012)
Locked-in patients showed near to
normal connectivity
14 ↓: All areas showed less connectivity in
disorders of consciousness, decrease
of connectivity was negatively
correlated with consciousness. PCC
most significant decrease
ICA Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2010)
13 Presence of DMN has prognostic value ICA Norton et al. (2012)
Executive control network Light sleep 10 No difference Seed-based Larson-Prior et al. (2009)
Slow wave sleep 25 Correlations within the network persist
but decrease
ICA Sämann et al. (2011)
Light sedation 20 ↓: Right: middle frontal and posterior
parietal cortices.
Seed-based and ICA Boveroux et al. (2010)
Left: residual in middle frontal, PCC,
and temporo-occipital cortices
Salience Slow wave sleep 14 ↑: Connectivity between insula and left
ACC
Seed-based Martuzzi et al. (2010)
↓: Decrease between connectivity in
the insula and supplementary motor
cortex and left middle frontal gyrus
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
N Functional connectivity change Method Study
Hypnosis 8 ↑: Increases in mid-insula, primary
sensory, and orbitofrontal cortex
Seed-based Derbyshire et al. (2004)
Sensorymotor network Light sleep 10 No difference Seed-based Larson-Prior et al. (2009)
Slow wave sleep 14 ↑: Connectivity within the network Seed-based Martuzzi et al. (2010)
Light sedation 12 ↑: Within-network increases ICA Greicius et al. (2008)
Auditory Slow wave sleep 14 No difference Seed-based Martuzzi et al. (2010)
Light sedation 20 No difference Seed-based and ICA Boveroux et al. (2010)
Visual Light sleep 10 No difference Seed-based Larson-Prior et al. (2009)
Light sedation 14 ↑: Primary visual area with the cuneus
and lingual gyrus
Seed-based Martuzzi et al. (2010)
Anesthesia 20 No difference Seed-based and ICA Boveroux et al. (2010)
Upper arrow denotes increases in functional connectivity; lower arrow denotes decreases in functional connectivity. (DMN, default mode network; PCC, posterior
cingulate cortex; PHG, parahippocampal gyrus; IPC, inferior parietal cortex; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; STG, superior temporal
gyrus, ICA, independent component analysis).
behavior and it has been linked to cognitive processes of external
sensory input, such as somatosensory (e.g., Boly et al., 2007), visual
(e.g., Dehaene and Changeux, 2005), and auditory (e.g., Brunetti
et al., 2008). Previous studies showed that these two systems are of
a competing character in the sense that they can disturb or even
interrupt each other (e.g., Tian et al., 2007). Such anticorrelated
pattern is also illustrated in activation studies on motor perfor-
mance (Fox et al., 2007), perceptual discrimination (Sapir et al.,
2005), attentional lapses (Weissman et al., 2006), and somatosen-
sory perception of stimuli close to somatosensory threshold (Boly
et al., 2007). We recently determined the cognitive-behavioral
counterpart of such “resting state” activity and showed that activ-
ity in the DMN corresponded to behavioral reports of “internal”
awareness (i.e., self-related thoughts). Conversely, subjective rat-
ings for “external” awareness (i.e., perception of the environment
through the senses) correlated with the activity of an “extrinsic”
system (encompassing lateral frontoparietal cortices; Vanhauden-
huyse et al., 2011). These findings depict that the anticorrelated
pattern between DMN and the extrinsic system is of functional
significance to conscious cognition. With an aim to further char-
acterize the role of these two systems to subjective awareness, we
sought to modulate their relationship by means of hypnosis. We
found that, as compared to a control condition of autobiograph-
ical mental imagery, there was a hypnosis-related reduction in
connectivity in the “extrinsic” system, reflecting a decreased sen-
sory or perceptual awareness. Interestingly, this modulated activity
was paralleled to subjective reports of increased sense of dissoci-
ation from the environment and reduced intensity of “external
thoughts” (Demertzi et al., 2011b).
Taken together these data indicate that DMN and anticorrelated
extrinsic system activity underlies (at least partially) conscious
ongoing mentation. It should be mentioned that fMRI anticorre-
lations were previously subject to debate in the literature. It has
been argued, for instance, that fMRI functional anticorrelations
are nothing more than noise in the signal due to regression of
the brain’s global activity during data preprocessing (Anderson
et al., 2010). Other data, however, suggest that the anticorrelations
persist both with and without global signal regression, suggesting
some underlying biological origins for this anticorrelated pattern
(Fox et al., 2009; Chai et al., 2012). We would agree with the latter
evidence which is supported by studies in unconscious condi-
tions, such as anesthesia (Boveroux et al., 2010; Figure 2), sleep
(Sämann et al., 2011), and in unresponsive patients (Boly et al.,
2009) where these anticorrelations generally reduce or even dis-
appear, accounting for their functional contribution to conscious
cognition.
BEYOND THE DMN: RESTING STATE ACTIVITY IN MULTIPLE
CEREBRAL NETWORKS
Importantly, the different functions of a brain region cannot be
understood in isolation, meaning in terms of functional segre-
gation, but only in conjunction with regions it interacts with,
that is in terms of functional integration (Seghier et al., 2010).
Therefore, we further focus our review on other “large-scale
higher-order” (bilateral executive control and salience networks)
and sensorimotor-sensory (auditory, visual) RSNs, which can be
consistently identified in healthy conditions (Figure 2).
The executive control network during normal wakefulness
encompasses bilateral middle, inferior and superior frontal cor-
tices, bilateral inferior parietal lobes, ACC/supplementary motor
area (SMA), and bilateral insular cortices (Figure 1). Resting
state independent components analysis identified this network
in a lateralized manner. The left executive control network is
thought to be more involved in cognitive and “language” para-
digms while the right executive control network relates to per-
ceptual, somesthetic, and nociception processing (Smith et al.,
2009; Laird et al., 2011). Activity in both these two networks is
reduced during deep sleep (Sämann et al., 2011) and anesthe-
sia (Boveroux et al., 2010) whereas light sleep does not seem
to mediate functional connectivity in these networks (Larson-
Prior et al., 2009; Table 1). Taken together, these results high-
light the involvement of the executive control networks in the
perception of the external world, in line with previous sugges-
tion that activity of these areas is a necessary condition for
conscious (i.e., reportable) visual perception (Dehaene et al.,
2003).
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FIGURE 2 | Spontaneous fMRI BOLD activity in the default mode
network (in blue; considered to reflect self-related mentation)
anticorrelates with the activity of a lateral frontoparietal system (in
red; considered to mediate conscious perception of the external
world). Here, this anticorrelated activity is shown for normal wakefulness,
hypnotic state, and during deep anesthesia. Of note is the absence of the
activity in the “extrinsic” frontoparietal system in the two conditions of
altered sense of awareness (hypnosis, anesthesia) which is considered as
suggestive of a diminished “external” awareness (i.e., the perception of the
environment through the senses). Statistical maps are thresholded at a
false discovery error rate p<0.05 and rendered on a structural T1 magnetic
resonance image of a healthy subject (x and z values indicate Talairach
coordinates of the represented sections).
The salience network encompasses fronto-insular and ACCs
(Figure 1) with connections to subcortical and limbic structures.
In normal conditions, this network is implicated in the orientation
toward salient emotional stimuli (Seeley et al., 2007), conflict mon-
itoring, information integration, and response selection (Cole and
Schneider, 2007; Roberts and Hall, 2008). It has been proposed
that the salience network enables the switch between internal
attention (the default mode) and task-related states (Menon and
Uddin, 2010). The salience network has also been linked to pain-
related processes both during acute stimulus-induced pain (Tracey
and Mantyh, 2007), during resting state while anticipating pain
(Ploner et al., 2010; Wiech et al., 2010), and after hypnotic sug-
gestions for creating pain experiences in the absence of a noxious
stimulus (Derbyshire et al., 2004). Under light sevoflurane seda-
tion, increased connectivity between the ACC and the insula was
observed, although connectivity between the insula and the sec-
ondary somatosensory cortex was reduced (Martuzzi et al., 2010).
Analysis of the salience network in comatose states could be bene-
ficial for the study of pain and possible suffering in these patients in
the absence of external stimulation. Indeed, such stimulations are
not always feasible due to sophisticated setups or due to patients’
clinical picture. Hence, salience network resting state analysis
could shed light on the cerebral substrate that could account for
patients’ orientation to salient stimuli, including painful ones.
The sensorimotor network resembles the activations seen in
motor tasks (Biswal et al., 1995). In normal wakefulness it encom-
passes the SMA/midcingulate cortex, bilateral primary motor cor-
tex, and bilateral middle frontal gyri (Biswal et al., 1995; Greicius
et al., 2008; Figure 1). During light sedation the sensorimotor net-
work shows increases in functional connectivity (Greicius et al.,
2008; Martuzzi et al., 2010). To date, the above networks have not
been further investigated under other unconscious states.
The auditory network, important in audition, such as
tone/pitch discrimination, music, and speech (Laird et al., 2011)
in normal wakefulness, encompasses primary and secondary audi-
tory cortices, including Heschl’s gyrus, bilateral superior temporal
gyri, and posterior insular cortex (Figure 1). During normal wake-
fulness, resting state independent component analysis (ICA) also
identifies the visual network in three independent components
(Figure 1). One network, the lateral visual network includes the
middle temporal visual association area at the temporo-occipital
junction and is most important in complex (emotional) stimuli
(Laird et al., 2011). The other networks include medial and occip-
ital visual networks, important in simple visual (e.g., a flickering
checkerboard), and higher-order visual stimuli (e.g., orthogra-
phy), respectively (Beckmann et al., 2005; Damoiseaux et al., 2006;
Allen et al., 2011; Laird et al., 2011). No difference in connectiv-
ity was identified between both these primary auditory and visual
sensory networks and light sleep (Larson-Prior et al., 2009), or
between awake and sedation (Boveroux et al., 2010; Martuzzi et al.,
2010). One study showed increased temporal synchrony in audi-
tory and visual areas in light midazolam sedation (Kiviniemi et al.,
2005). The visual cortex has been shown to possess higher ampli-
tude of BOLD fluctuations when asleep (Fukunaga et al., 2006).
This indicates that resting state activity continues in these areas
during sleep, and thus transcends consciousness. Finally, reliably
indicated as possessing functional connectivity is the cerebellum.
This network is associated with action and somesthesis (Laird
et al., 2011), but not yet thoroughly studied in altered states of
consciousness.
ANALYZING RESTING STATE DATA FROM PATHOLOGICAL
BRAINS: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
The clinical neuro-investigation of severely brain-injured patients
with the resting state paradigm is technically easier compared to
activation (Schiff et al., 2005) or “active” mental imagery protocols
(e.g., Monti et al., 2010). This is because patients do not have to
perform any task, and such data can have faster translation into
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clinical practice (Soddu et al., 2011). Depending on the adopted
methodology, several issues need to be taken into account when
analyzing resting state acquisitions from clinical populations. To
date, two main approaches are employed; hypothesis-driven seed-
voxel correlation analysis and data-driven ICA (see Table 1 for the
adopted approach by each reviewed study). Each method has its
own advantages, yet their methodological difficulties, especially in
non-collaborative patients, which merit to be acknowledged.
HYPOTHESIS-DRIVEN METHOD: SEED-BASED CORRELATION ANALYSIS
The seed-voxel approach uses extracted BOLD time course from
a region of interest and determines the temporal correlation
between this signal (the seed) and the time course from all other
brain voxels (Fox et al., 2005). This creates a whole-brain voxel-
wise functional connectivity map of covariance with the seed
region. It is the most straightforward method to analyze functional
connectivity of a particular brain region. The method gives direct
answers to specific hypotheses about functional connectivity of
that region. It is attractive and elegant for many researchers as the
data can be interpreted relatively easily when a well-defined seed
area is used. When applying this approach to the study of resting
state activity in patients with disorders of consciousness, several
controversial issues arise. A first general issue concerns regress-
ing out the global activity from the BOLD signal, which might
induce spurious anticorrelations (Fox et al., 2009; Murphy et al.,
2009). However, in the case of brain death (a condition where the
brain totally lacks neuronal activity and arterial blood flow), this
type of regression is an important step to obtain the obvious zero
connectivity in this condition (Boly et al., 2009). Alternatively,
a non-zero BOLD signal measured in brain death can be taken
to be artifactual, contaminated by head motion or heart beat-
ing (Soddu et al., 2011). Next, patients with severe brain injuries
may suffer from structural deformations resulting from traumatic
brain injury and focal hemorrhages. Additionally, patients with
severe chronic brain injuries usually develop atrophy and sec-
ondary hydrocephalus (i.e., ex vacuo dilation of the ventricles).
This implies that even if a statistical structural normalization pro-
cedure has been performed, the selection of a proper seed region
can become difficult and will require visual inspection by an expert
eye. This issue adds to the already intrinsic challenges of an priori
selection of the seed region which, in principle, can lead to as many
possible overlapping networks as the number of possible seeds
(Cole et al., 2010). Using seed-based analysis, other noisy con-
founds might be influencing the data (e.g., head motion, vascular
activity, scanner artifacts). To reduce such noise, the BOLD signal
can be preprocessed by regressing out head motion curves as well as
ventricular and white matter signal, and each of their first-order
derivative terms (Fox et al., 2005). Finally, as for all group-level
analyses, one has to take into account the between-subject vari-
ability, such as cortical folding or functional localization between
individuals or groups (Cole et al., 2010) which can be extremely
challenging in severely deformed brains.
DATA-DRIVEN METHOD: INDEPENDENT COMPONENT ANALYSIS
Data-driven methods are used to analyze whole-brain connectiv-
ity patterns without the need of a priori seed regions. ICA is the
most widely used methodology with high level of consistency in
results within subjects (van den Heuvel and Hulshoff Pol, 2010).
ICA divides an entire dataset into different maximally statistical
independent components and thus is able to isolate cortical con-
nectivity maps from non-neural signals (Beckmann et al., 2005).
Spontaneous activity is therefore automatically separated from
noise, such as head motion or physiological confounds (e.g., car-
diac pulsation, respiratory, and slow changes in the depth and rate
of breathing; Beckmann and Smith, 2004). This method has the
advantage that it can evaluate and compare the coherence of activ-
ity in multiple distributed voxels (Cole et al., 2010). The advantage
is that it divides different RSNs into different components. How-
ever, ICA does not provide any classification or ordering of the
independent components. It is therefore perceived as more diffi-
cult to understand due to the complex representation of the data.
The most straightforward method for labeling the components
is by visual inspection, but this lacks reproducibility and could
be hard to perform in cases with a large component dimension-
ality. Alternatively, an automatic selection is preferable but the
way to choose the right independent component remains a del-
icate issue. By merely performing a spatial similarity test with
a predefined template has been shown not to be successful for
choosing the right component (Soddu et al., 2012). Some auto-
matic approaches for component selection have been proposed,
based on template matching using the “goodness of fit” as an out-
come index. However, these methods have to be interpreted with
care especially in cases of deformed brains as in patients with
a traumatic brain injury or comatose state. It was recently pro-
posed that when selecting independent components in patients
populations, spatial, temporal, and a “compromise” between spa-
tial and temporal properties of the network of interest need to
be met (Soddu et al., 2012). For example, a component can be
erroneously selected as the RSN of interest if the selection is based
on the spatial pattern ignoring the properties in the time domain
(Figure 3, bottom right panel). Additionally, the determination of
the proper dimensionality (i.e., the “right” number of estimated
components) remains unclear. Extracting many components can
result in the spatial segregation of the network of interest into mul-
tiple sub-networks (Smith et al., 2009). It was shown, for example,
that the use of 75 components can reduce the DMN into four
components and the sensorimotor network in six (Allen et al.,
2011). When applying ICA in pathological brains it is probably
more useful not to select a large quantity of components, because
high component dimensionality can further reduce the chances
of identifying a network due to decrease in spatial pattern and
spectral properties (Tohka et al., 2008).
Other techniques to analyze resting state data exist such as
methods that focus on the (fractional) amplitude of low frequency
fluctuations [(f)ALFF; Zang et al., 2007; Zuo et al., 2010), or on the
small world characteristics using correlations and graph analysis
(Bullmore and Sporns, 2009; Zalesky et al., 2012].
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
The default mode network is the most widely studied network
in the resting state literature and has been linked to self-related
processes. To date, fMRI resting state studies show that DMN con-
nectivity is reduced under altered states of consciousness, such
as sleep, sedation/anesthesia, hypnotic state, and clinical states
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FIGURE 3 |The challenge of selecting the “right” independent
component as the resting state network of interest in pathological
conditions. The figure illustrates the spatial pattern (brain maps, z values
0.8–10) and spatial-temporal properties (fingerprints: a representation of
the component in a multidimensional space of parameters; De Martino
et al., 2007) of the default mode network in healthy consciousness states
(healthy subject, patient with locked-in syndrome; upper row) and in two
patients with vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome
(VS/UWS; lower row). For the healthy control, the locked-in syndrome and
the VS/UWS patient in the lower left corner, the default mode network
shows the characteristic properties in both the spatial and the temporal
domain (i.e., the fingerprints pick in the 0.02–0.05 Hz frequency band
labeled with the number 9) even if for the VS/UWS patient the spatial
pattern is only partially preserved. Of note is that the second VS/UWS
patient exhibits the spatial pattern of the default mode network but
importantly the time course of this component is characterized by high
frequency fluctuations, in the 0.1–0.25 Hz frequency band and high spatial
entropy (labeled, respectively, with the number 11 and 4 in the fingerprint).
Therefore, such activity cannot be considered of neuronal origin. As a
consequence, if the component selection was merely based on a spatial
similarity test (e.g., with a predefined template), then this component
could be erroneously selected and further statistically analyzed. A
“compromise” in the selection of the appropriate network of interest in
the space and time domain is needed to will eventually exclude
non-neuronal contributions [Fingerprint labels: (1) degree of clustering, (2)
skewness, (3) kurtosis, (4) spatial entropy, (5) autocorrelation, (6) temporal
entropy, power: (7) 0–0.008 Hz, (8) 0.008–0.02 Hz, (9) 0.02–0.05 Hz, (10)
0.05–0.1 Hz, (11) 0.1–0.25 Hz].
of disorders of consciousness (VS/UWS, MCS, coma, and brain
death). Such connectivity alterations can be discussed in two non-
mutually exclusive ways. On one hand, one can refer to these
reductions in resting state connectivity during altered conscious
states as reflecting reduced capacities for (conscious) cognitive
processing (e.g., Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010). On the other hand,
we can equally talk about persistent (albeit reduced) functional
connectivity pattern in unconscious states, which transcends the
level of consciousness, and which is considered as a physiologic
baseline (e.g., Raichle et al., 2001). In any case, it seems that the
purposes and questions of each study will eventually determine
how such alterations can be further discussed and interpreted.
Both the scientific and clinical implications for cognition seem to
be the essence of resting state connectivity measurements.
At the scientific level, resting state analyses shed light on the
necessary conditions needed for conscious awareness to take place.
In other words, in the absence of external stimulation, resting
state functional connectivity paradigms could quantify the min-
imal prerequisites under which cognitive processes can become
“conscious.” This could mean that in the presence of an adequate
neural substrate (i.e., the RSN), one could infer preserved capac-
ities for conscious cognition. Of course the absence of functional
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connectivity cannot be taken as a proof for incapacity for con-
scious awareness. Indeed, it has been suggested that functional
connections are best recruited after external stimulation (Honey
et al., 2009). In any case, the sufficiency of the RSNs integrity
to consciousness remains to be further determined with studies
measuring effective connectivity (Churchland, 2007).
In summary, we here reviewed studies in resting state fMRI con-
nectivity of “higher-order” associative cerebral networks (default
mode, right and left executive control, and salience) and “lower-
level” sensory (auditory and visual) and sensorimotor networks
under various altered states of consciousness. As previously pro-
posed, in order for humans to be conscious of something, incom-
ing information (via sensory networks) needs to be made globally
available to multiple brain systems via long-range neurons associa-
tive networks (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Here, the reviewed
studies suggest that resting state connectivity is preserved but
altered in most RSNs under physiological and pharmacologi-
cal states, impeding information integration. It should be noted
here that it was not among our aims to exhaustively review all
spectrum of altered states of consciousness. Much research has
been conducted in states of altered sense of awareness, such as
in neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g., dementias and schizophre-
nia; for a review see Buckner et al., 2008), meditation (Brewer
et al., 2011; Josipovic et al., 2012), and drug-related states such as
alcohol (Esposito et al., 2010), amphetamine (Roberts and Gar-
avan, 2010), or psychedelic drugs (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012)
which in general show changes in the connection between the
posterior cingulate and frontal areas. Resting state investigations
have also been attempted using other modalities, such as elec-
troencephalography (e.g., Lehembre et al., 2012). Rather, we here
focused on RSNs obtained using fMRI. We reviewed changes in
functional connectivity as a function of various states of wake-
fulness. This aim lies within our ultimate clinical goal to bet-
ter document, manage and predict residual brain functioning
of patients with disorders of consciousness. As these patients
are incapable of functional communication with their environ-
ment, they might be wrongly diagnosed as unconscious when
locked-in (Laureys et al., 2005) or when suffering from apha-
sia (Majerus et al., 2009). The ethical implications of erroneous
diagnostics are apparent, especially when pain (Demertzi et al.,
2009, 2012) and end-of-life issues (Demertzi et al., 2011a) are
discussed.
At the clinical level, the study of resting state activity in patho-
logical states of consciousness can become demanding due to
both clinical and methodological issues. For example, patients
who show increased prescan motion activity will need to be
anesthetized to reduce the noise during data acquisition. Apart
from the clinical issue of applying anesthetics to these vulnera-
ble patients, the effect of anesthesia will need to be accounted for
in the acquired data. This is added to the methodological chal-
lenge of the spatial normalization of severely deformed brains
(Shen et al., 2007). Additionally, identified resting state connec-
tivity patterns need to be interpreted according to the studied
population. In brain death, for instance, it was shown that resting
state fMRI activity is absent in line with the clinical neurological
criteria for the diagnosis of death (Boly et al., 2009). Therefore,
in cases where resting state activity, in the DMN for example, is
identified, such findings can be pertained to motion and other
artifacts, not indicative of neuronal activity (Soddu et al., 2011).
The characterization of the fMRI functional connectivity of other
RSNs in comatose states remains to be further elucidated. It can
be expected, though, that in such severely constrained situations,
like in disorders of consciousness, the functional integrity of most
RSNs is considerably restricted accounting for patients’ limited
capacities for conscious cognition.
Despite intrinsic limitations, resting state data are technically
easier to obtain in patients’ population, as compared to auditory
(Schiff et al., 2005) or visual (Monti et al., 2012) activation pro-
tocols or “active” mental imagery protocols (Monti et al., 2010;
Bardin et al., 2011). The challenge now is twofold: first, to unravel
the relationship (i.e., correlations, anticorrelations) between and
among the RSNs under various conscious conditions. The second
challenge is to move from static functional connectivity mea-
surements to the assessment of the temporal dynamics of such
associations, meaning looking at changes in functional connectiv-
ity across time. Such imperatives are justified when considering
the nature of intrinsic brain activity, which is ongoing and which
characterizes most areas of the brain, beyond the DMN (Raichle
and Snyder, 2007).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by the Belgian National Funds for Sci-
entific Research (FNRS), the European Commission, the James
McDonnell Foundation, the Mind Science Foundation, the French
Speaking Community Concerted Research Action (ARC-06/11-
340), the Public Utility Foundation “Université Européenne du
Travail,” “Fondazione Europea di Ricerca Biomedica,” and the
University Hospital of Liège.
REFERENCES
Allen, E. A., Erhardt, E. B., Damaraju,
E., Gruner, W., Segall, J. M., Silva,
R. F., Havlicek, M., Rachakonda,
S., Fries, J., Kalyanam, R., Michael,
A. M., Caprihan, A., Turner, J. A.,
Eichele, T., Adelsheim, S., Bryan,
A. D., Bustillo, J., Clark, V. P.,
Feldstein Ewing, S. W., Filbey, F.,
Ford, C. C., Hutchison, K., Jung, R.
E., Kiehl, K. A., Kodituwakku, P.,
Komesu, Y. M., Mayer, A. R., Pearl-
son, G. D., Phillips, J. P., Sadek,
J. R., Stevens, M., Teuscher, U.,
Thoma, R. J., and Calhoun, V. D.
(2011). A baseline for the multi-
variate comparison of resting-state
networks. Front. Syst. Neurosci. 5:2.
doi:10.3389/fnsys.2011.00002
American Society of Anesthesiologists
Task Force on Intraoperative Aware-
ness. (2006). Practice advisory for
intraoperative awareness and brain
function monitoring a report by
the American society of anesthesi-
ologists task force on intraopera-
tive awareness. Anesthesiology 104,
847–864.
Anderson, J. S., Druzgal, T. J., Lopez-
Larson, M., Jeong, E. K., Desai, K.,
and Yurgelun-Todd, D. (2010). Net-
work anticorrelations, global regres-
sion, and phase-shifted soft tissue
correction. Hum. Brain Mapp. 32,
919–934.
Bardin, J. C., Fins, J. J., Katz, D. I.,
Hersh, J., Heier, L. A., Tabelow, K.,
Dyke, J. P., Ballon, D. J., Schiff, N. D.,
andVoss, H. U. (2011). Dissociations
between behavioural and functional
magnetic resonance imaging-based
evaluations of cognitive function
after brain injury. Brain 134,
769–782.
Beckmann, C. F., Deluca, M., Devlin, J.
T., and Smith, S. M. (2005). Inves-
tigations into resting-state connec-
tivity using independent component
analysis. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond.
B Biol. Sci. 360, 1001–1013.
Beckmann, C. F., and Smith, S.
M. (2004). Probabilistic indepen-
dent component analysis for func-
tional magnetic resonance imag-
ing. IEEE Trans. Med. Imaging 23,
137–152.
www.frontiersin.org August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 295 | 9
Heine et al. Resting state networks and consciousness
Beckmann, C. F., and Smith, S. M.
(2004). Probabilistic independent
component analysis for functional
magnetic resonance imaging. IEEE
Trans. Med. Imaging 23, 137–152.
Biswal, B.,Yetkin, F. Z., Haughton,V. M.,
and Hyde, J. S. (1995). Functional
connectivity in the motor cortex of
resting human brain using echo-
planar MRI. Magn. Reson. Med. 34,
537–541.
Boly, M., Balteau, E., Schnakers, C.,
Degueldre, C., Moonen, G., Luxen,
A., Phillips, C., Peigneux, P., Maquet,
P., and Laureys, S. (2007). Base-
line brain activity fluctuations pre-
dict somatosensory perception in
humans. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
104, 12187–12192.
Boly, M., Perlbarg, V., Marrelec, G.,
Schabus, M., Laureys, S., Doyon,
J., Pelegrini-Issac, M., Maquet, P.,
and Benali, H. (2012). Hierarchi-
cal clustering of brain activity dur-
ing human nonrapid eye movement
sleep. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
109, 5856–5861.
Boly, M., Tshibanda, L., Vanhau-
denhuyse, A., Noirhomme, Q.,
Schnakers, C., Ledoux, D., Bover-
oux, P., Garweg, C., Lambermont, B.,
Phillips, C., Luxen, A., Moonen, G.,
Bassetti, C., Maquet, P., and Laureys,
S. (2009). Functional connectivity in
the default network during resting
state is preserved in a vegetative but
not in a brain dead patient. Hum.
Brain Mapp. 30, 2393–2400.
Boveroux, P., Vanhaudenhuyse, A.,
Bruno, M. A., Noirhomme, Q.,
Lauwick, S., Luxen, A., Degueldre,
C., Plenevaux, A., Schnakers, C.,
Phillips, C., Brichant, J. F., Bon-
homme, V., Maquet, P., Greicius,
M. D., Laureys, S., and Boly, M.
(2010). Breakdown of within- and
between-network resting state func-
tional magnetic resonance imag-
ing connectivity during propofol-
induced loss of consciousness. Anes-
thesiology 113, 1038–1053.
Brewer, J. A., Worhunsky, P. D., Gray, J.
R., Tang, Y. Y., Weber, J., and Kober,
H. (2011). Meditation experience is
associated with differences in default
mode network activity and connec-
tivity. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
108, 20254–20259.
Brunetti, M., Della Penna, S., Ferretti,
A., Del Gratta, C., Cianflone, F.,
Belardinelli, P., Caulo, M., Pizzella,
V., Olivetti Belardinelli, M., and
Romani, G. L. (2008). A fron-
toparietal network for spatial atten-
tion reorienting in the auditory
domain: a human fMRI/MEG study
of functional and temporal dynam-
ics. Cereb. Cortex 18, 1139–1147.
Bruno, M.-A., Vanhaudenhuyse, A.,
Thibaut, A., Moonen, G., and Lau-
reys, S. (2011). From unrespon-
sive wakefulness to minimally con-
scious PLUS and functional locked-
in syndromes: recent advances in
our understanding of disorders
of consciousness. J. Neurol. 258,
1373–1384.
Buckner, R. L., Andrews-Hanna, J. R.,
and Schacter, D. L. (2008). The
brain’s default network: anatomy,
function, and relevance to disease.
Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1124, 1–38.
Bullmore, E., and Sporns, O. (2009).
Complex brain networks: graph the-
oretical analysis of structural and
functional systems. Nat. Rev. Neu-
rosci. 10, 186–198.
Carhart-Harris, R. L., Erritzoe, D.,
Williams, T., Stone, J. M., Reed, L. J.,
Colasanti, A., Tyacke, R. J., Leech, R.,
Malizia, A. L., Murphy, K., Hobden,
P., Evans, J., Feilding, A., Wise, R. G.,
and Nutt, D. J. (2012). Neural corre-
lates of the psychedelic state as deter-
mined by fMRI studies with psilocy-
bin. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109,
2138–2143.
Chai, X. J., Castanon, A. N., Ongur,
D., and Whitfield-Gabrieli, S. (2012).
Anticorrelations in resting state net-
works without global signal regres-
sion. Neuroimage 59, 1420–1428.
Churchland, P. S. (2007). The necessary-
and-sufficient boondoggle. Am. J.
Bioeth. 7, 54–55; discussion W51–
W54.
Cole, D. M., Smith, S. M., and Beck-
mann, C. F. (2010). Advances and
pitfalls in the analysis and inter-
pretation of resting-state FMRI
data. Front. Syst. Neurosci. 4:8.
doi:10.3389/fnsys.2010.00008
Cole, M. W., and Schneider, W. (2007).
The cognitive control network: inte-
grated cortical regions with dis-
sociable functions. Neuroimage 37,
343–360.
Cordes, D., Haughton, V. M., Arfanakis,
K., Carew, J. D., Turski, P. A., Moritz,
C. H., Quigley, M. A., and Meyerand,
M. E. (2001). Frequencies contribut-
ing to functional connectivity in
the cerebral cortex in “resting-state”
data. AJNR Am. J. Neuroradiol. 22,
1326–1333.
Crone, J. S., Ladurner, G., Höller, Y.,
Golaszewski, S., Trinka, E., and Kro-
nbichler, M. (2011). Deactivation
of the default mode network as a
marker of impaired consciousness:
an fMRI study. PLoS ONE 6, e26373.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026373
Damoiseaux, J. S., Rombouts, S. A.,
Barkhof, F., Scheltens, P., Stam, C.
J., Smith, S. M., and Beckmann, C.
F. (2006). Consistent resting-state
networks across healthy subjects.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 103,
13848–13853.
De Luca, M., Beckmann, C. F., De Ste-
fano, N., Matthews, P. M., and Smith,
S. M. (2006). fMRI resting state net-
works define distinct modes of long-
distance interactions in the human
brain. Neuroimage 29, 1359–1367.
De Martino, F., Gentile, F., Esposito, F.,
Balsi, M., Di Salle, F., Goebel, R.,
and Formisano, E. (2007). Classifi-
cation of fMRI independent com-
ponents using IC-fingerprints and
support vector machine classifiers.
Neuroimage 34, 177–194.
Dehaene, S., and Changeux, J. P.
(2005). Ongoing spontaneous activ-
ity controls access to conscious-
ness: a neuronal model for inatten-
tional blindness. PLoS Biol. 3, e141.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0030141
Dehaene, S., and Changeux, J. P.
(2011). Experimental and theoreti-
cal approaches to conscious process-
ing. Neuron 70, 200–227.
Dehaene, S., Sergent, C., and Changeux,
J. P. (2003). A neuronal network
model linking subjective reports and
objective physiological data during
conscious perception. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 100, 8520–8525.
Demertzi, A., Ledoux, D., Bruno, M.-A.,
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Gosseries, O.,
Soddu, A., Schnakers, C., Moonen,
G., and Laureys, S. (2011a). Attitudes
towards end-of-life issues in disor-
ders of consciousness: a European
survey. J. Neurol. 258, 1058–1065.
Demertzi, A., Soddu, A., Faymonville,
M. E., Bahri, M. A., Gosseries, O.,
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Phillips, C.,
Maquet, P., Noirhomme, Q., Luxen,
A., and Laureys, S. (2011b). Hyp-
notic modulation of resting state
fMRI default mode and extrinsic
network connectivity. Prog. Brain
Res. 193, 309–322.
Demertzi, A., Racine, E., Bruno, M. A.,
Ledoux, D., Gosseries, O., Vanhau-
denhuyse, A., Thonnard, M., Soddu,
A., Moonen, G., and Laureys, S.
(2012). Pain perception in disorders
of consciousness: neuroscience, clin-
ical care, and ethics in dialogue.Neu-
roethics 1–14. doi:10.1007/s12152-
011-9149-x
Demertzi, A., Schnakers, C., Ledoux,
D., Chatelle, C., Bruno, M.-A., Van-
haudenhuyse, A., Boly, M., Moonen,
G., and Laureys, S. (2009). Different
beliefs about pain perception in the
vegetative and minimally conscious
states: a European survey of medical
and paramedical professionals. Prog.
Brain Res. 177, 329–338.
Derbyshire, S. W., Whalley, M. G.,
Stenger, V. A., and Oakley, D. A.
(2004). Cerebral activation during
hypnotically induced and imagined
pain. Neuroimage 23, 392–401.
Esposito, F., Pignataro, G., Di Renzo, G.,
Spinali, A., Paccone, A., Tedeschi, G.,
and Annunziato, L. (2010). Alcohol
increases spontaneous BOLD signal
fluctuations in the visual network.
Neuroimage 53, 534–543.
Fox, M. D., and Greicius, M. (2010).
Clinical applications of resting
state functional connectiv-
ity. Front. Syst. Neurosci. 4:19.
doi:10.3389/fnsys.2010.00019
Fox, M. D., and Raichle, M. E. (2007).
Spontaneous fluctuations in brain
activity observed with functional
magnetic resonance imaging. Nat.
Rev. Neurosci. 8, 700–711.
Fox, M. D., Snyder, A. Z., Vincent, J. L.,
Corbetta, M., Van Essen, D. C., and
Raichle, M. E. (2005). The human
brain is intrinsically organized into
dynamic, anticorrelated functional
networks. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 102, 9673.
Fox, M. D., Snyder, A. Z., Vincent, J. L.,
and Raichle, M. E. (2007). Intrin-
sic fluctuations within cortical sys-
tems account for intertrial variabil-
ity in human behavior. Neuron 56,
171–184.
Fox, M. D., Zhang, D., Snyder, A. Z.,
and Raichle, M. E. (2009). The global
signal and observed anticorrelated
resting state brain networks. J. Neu-
rophysiol. 101, 3270–3283.
Fransson, P. (2005). Spontaneous low-
frequency BOLD signal fluctuations:
an fMRI investigation of the resting-
state default mode of brain function
hypothesis. Hum. Brain Mapp. 26,
15–29.
Fukunaga, M., Horovitz, S. G., van
Gelderen, P., de Zwart, J. A., Jansma,
J. M., Ikonomidou, V. N., Chu, R.,
Deckers, R. H., Leopold, D. A., and
Duyn, J. H(2006). Large-amplitude,
spatially correlated fluctuations in
BOLD fMRI signals during extended
rest and early sleep stages. Magn.
Reson. Imaging 24, 979–992.
Giacino, J. T., Ashwal, S., Childs, N.,
Cranford, R., Jennett, B., Katz, D. I.,
Kelly, J. P., Rosenberg, J. H., Whyte,
J., Zafonte, R. D., and Zasler, N.
D. (2002). The minimally conscious
state: definition and diagnostic cri-
teria. Neurology 58, 349–353.
Goldberg, I. I., Harel, M., and Malach,
R. (2006). When the brain loses its
self: prefrontal inactivation during
sensorimotor processing.Neuron 50,
329–339.
Golland,Y., Bentin, S., Gelbard, H., Ben-
jamini, Y., Heller, R., Nir, Y., Hasson,
U., and Malach, R. (2007). Extrinsic
and intrinsic systems in the posterior
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 295 | 10
Heine et al. Resting state networks and consciousness
cortex of the human brain revealed
during natural sensory stimulation.
Cereb. Cortex 17, 766–777.
Greicius, M. D., Kiviniemi, V., Tervo-
nen, O., Vainionpää, V., Alahuhta,
S., Reiss, A. L., and Menon,
V. (2008). Persistent default-mode
network connectivity during light
sedation. Hum. Brain Mapp. 29,
839–847.
Greicius, M. D., Krasnow, B., Reiss, A.
L., and Menon,V. (2003). Functional
connectivity in the resting brain:
a network analysis of the default
mode hypothesis. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 100, 253.
Hobson, J. A., and Pace-Schott, E. F.
(2002). The cognitive neuroscience
of sleep: neuronal systems, con-
sciousness, and learning. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 3, 679–693.
Honey, C. J., Sporns, O., Cammoun, L.,
Gigandet, X., Thiran, J. P., Meuli, R.,
and Hagmann, P. (2009). Predicting
human resting-state functional con-
nectivity from structural connectiv-
ity. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106,
2035–2040.
Horovitz, S. G., Braun, A. R., Carr, W. S.,
Picchioni, D., Balkin, T. J., Fukunaga,
M., and Duyn, J. H. (2009). Decou-
pling of the brain’s default mode net-
work during deep sleep. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106, 11376–11381.
Horovitz,S. G.,Fukunaga,M.,De Zwart,
J. A., Van Gelderen, P., Fulton, S.
C., Balkin, T. J., and Duyn, J. H.
(2008). Low frequency BOLD fluc-
tuations during resting wakefulness
and light sleep: a simultaneous EEG-
fMRI study. Hum. Brain Mapp. 29,
671–682.
Josipovic, Z., Dinstein, I., Weber,
J., and Heeger, D. J. (2012).
Influence of meditation on anti-
correlated networks in the brain.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 5:183.
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2011.00183
Kiviniemi, V. J., Haanpää, H., Kan-
tola, J.-H., Jauhiainen, J., Vainion-
pää, V., Alahuhta, S., and Tervo-
nen, O. (2005). Midazolam sedation
increases fluctuation and synchrony
of the resting brain BOLD signal.
Magn. Reson. Imaging 23, 531–537.
Laird, A. R., Fox, P. M., Eickhoff, S. B.,
Turner, J. A., Ray, K. L., Mckay, D.
R., Glahn, D. C., Beckmann, C. F.,
Smith, S. M., and Fox, P. T. (2011).
Behavioral interpretations of intrin-
sic connectivity networks. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 23, 4022–4037.
Larson-Prior, L. J., Zempel, J. M., Nolan,
T. S., Prior, F. W., Snyder, A. Z., and
Raichle, M. E. (2009). Cortical net-
work functional connectivity in the
descent to sleep. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 106, 4489–4494.
Laureys, S., Celesia, G. G., Cohadon, F.,
Lavrijsen, J., Leon-Carrrion, J., San-
nita,W. G., Sazbon, L., Schmutzhard,
E.,Von Wild, K. R., Zeman,A., Dolce,
G., and Disorders of Consciousness,
T. E. (2010). Unresponsive wakeful-
ness syndrome: a new name for the
vegetative state or apallic syndrome.
BMC Med. 8, 68. doi:10.1186/1741-
7015-8-68
Laureys, S., Pellas, F., Van Eeckhout, P.,
Ghorbel, S., Schnakers, C., Perrin, F.,
Berre, J., Faymonville, M.-E., Pantke,
K.-H., Damas, F., Lamy, M., Moo-
nen, G., and Goldman, S. (2005).
The locked-in syndrome: what is it
like to be conscious but paralyzed
and voiceless? Prog. Brain Res. 150,
495–511.
Lehembre, R., Bruno, M., Vanhauden-
huyse, A., Chatelle, C., Cologan,
V., Leclercq, Y., Soddu, A., Macq,
B., Laureys, S., and Noirhomme,
Q. (2012). Resting state EEG study
of comatose patients: a connectiv-
ity and frequency analysis to find
differences between vegetative and
minimally conscious states. Funct.
Neurol. 27, 41–47.
Lou, H. C., Luber, B., Crupain, M.,
Keenan, J. P., Nowak, M., Kjaer, T.
W., Sackeim, H. A., and Lisanby,
S. H. (2004). Parietal cortex and
representation of the mental self.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 101,
6827–6832.
Majerus, S., Bruno, M. A., Schnakers,
C., Giacino, J. T., and Laureys, S.
(2009). The problem of aphasia in
the assessment of consciousness in
brain-damaged patients. Prog. Brain
Res. 177, 49–61.
Martuzzi, R., Ramani, R., Qiu, M.,
Rajeevan, N., and Constable, R. T.
(2010). Functional connectivity and
alterations in baseline brain state in
humans. Neuroimage 49, 823–834.
Mason, M. F., Norton, M. I., Van Horn,
J. D., Wegner, D., Grafton, S. T.,
and Macrae, C. N. (2007). Wan-
dering minds: the default network
and stimulus-independent thought.
Science 315, 393–395.
Mazoyer, B., Zago, L., Mellet, E.,
Bricogne, S., Etard, O., Houde, O.,
Crivello, F., Joliot, M., Petit, L., and
Tzourio-Mazoyer, N. (2001). Corti-
cal networks for working memory
and executive functions sustain the
conscious resting state in man. Brain
Res. Bull. 54, 287–298.
McGeown, W. J., Mazzoni, G., Venneri,
A., and Kirsch, I. (2009). Hypnotic
induction decreases anterior default
mode activity. Conscious. Cogn. 18,
848–855.
McKiernan, K. A., D’angelo, B. R., Kauf-
man, J. N., and Binder, J. R. (2006).
Interrupting the “stream of con-
sciousness”: an fMRI investigation.
Neuroimage 29, 1185–1191.
Menon, V., and Uddin, L. Q. (2010).
Saliency, switching, attention and
control: a network model of insula
function. Brain Struct. Funct. 214,
655–667.
Monti, M. M., Pickard, J. D., and
Owen, A. M. (2012). Visual cog-
nition in disorders of conscious-
ness: from V1 to top-down atten-
tion. Hum. Brain Mapp. doi:
10.1002/hbm.21507. [Epub ahead of
print].
Monti, M. M., Vanhaudenhuyse, A.,
Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Pickard, J.
D., Tshibanda, L., Owen, A. M., and
Laureys, S. (2010). Willful modula-
tion of brain activity in disorders of
consciousness. N. Engl. J. Med. 362,
579–589.
Murphy, K., Birn, R. M., Handwerker,
D. A., Jones, T. B., and Bandettini,
P. A. (2009). The impact of global
signal regression on resting state
correlations: are anti-correlated net-
works introduced? Neuroimage 44,
893–905.
Norton, L., Hutchison, R. M., Young, G.
B., Lee, D. H., Sharpe, M. D., and
Mirsattari, S. M. (2012). Disruptions
of functional connectivity in the
default mode network of comatose
patients. Neurology 78, 175–181.
Ploner, M., Lee, M. C., Wiech, K., Bingel,
U., and Tracey, I. (2010). Prestim-
ulus functional connectivity deter-
mines pain perception in humans.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107,
355–360.
Posner, J., Saper, C., Schiff, N. D., and
Plum, F. (eds). (2007).PlumandPos-
ner’s Diagnosis of Stupor and Coma.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Raichle, M. E., Macleod, A. M., Snyder,
A. Z., Powers, W. J., Gusnard, D. A.,
and Shulman, G. L. (2001). A default
mode of brain function. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 98, 676–682.
Raichle, M. E., and Snyder, A. Z. (2007).
A default mode of brain function:
a brief history of an evolving idea.
Neuroimage 37, 1083–1090; discus-
sion 1097–1089.
Roberts, G. M., and Garavan, H.
(2010). Evidence of increased acti-
vation underlying cognitive control
in ecstasy and cannabis users. Neu-
roimage 52, 429–435.
Roberts, K. L., and Hall, D. A. (2008).
Examining a supramodal network
for conflict processing: a system-
atic review and novel functional
magnetic resonance imaging data
for related visual and auditory
stroop tasks. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 20,
1063–1078.
Sämann, P. G., Wehrle, R., Hoehn, D.,
Spoormaker, V. I., Peters, H., Tully,
C., Holsboer, F., and Czisch, M.
(2011). Development of the brain’s
default mode network from wakeful-
ness to slow wave sleep.Cereb. Cortex
21, 2082–2093.
Sapir, A., D’Avossa, G., Mcavoy, M.,
Shulman, G. L., and Corbetta,
M. (2005). Brain signals for spa-
tial attention predict performance
in a motion discrimination task.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 102,
17810–17815.
Schiff, N. D., Rodriguez-Moreno, D.,
Kamal, A., Kim, K. H., Giacino, J.
T., Plum, F., and Hirsch, J. (2005).
fMRI reveals large-scale network
activation in minimally conscious
patients. Neurology 64, 514–523.
Schilbach, L., Eickhoff, S. B., Rotarska-
Jagiela, A., Fink, G. R., and Vogeley,
K. (2008). Minds at rest? Social cog-
nition as the default mode of cog-
nizing and its putative relationship
to the “default system” of the brain.
Conscious. Cogn. 17, 457–467.
Schrouff, J., Perlbarg, V., Boly, M.,
Marrelec, G., Boveroux, P., Vanhau-
denhuyse, A., Bruno, M.-A., Lau-
reys, S., Phillips, C., Pélégrini-Issac,
M., Maquet, P., and Benali, H.
(2011). Brain functional integration
decreases during propofol-induced
loss of consciousness. Neuroimage
57, 198–205.
Seeley, W. W., Menon, V., Schatzberg, A.
F., Keller, J., Glover, G. H., Kenna,
H., Reiss, A. L., and Greicius, M.
D. (2007). Dissociable intrinsic con-
nectivity networks for salience pro-
cessing and executive control. J.Neu-
rosci. 27, 2349–2356.
Seghier, M. L., Zeidman, P., Neufeld,
N. H., Leff, A. P., and Price,
C. J. (2010). Identifying abnor-
mal connectivity in patients using
dynamic causal modeling of FMRI
responses. Front. Syst. Neurosci.
4:142. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2010.00142
Shen, S., Szameitat, A. J., and Sterr,
A. (2007). VBM lesion detection
depends on the normalization tem-
plate: a study using simulated atro-
phy. Magn. Reson. Imaging 25,
1385–1396.
Shulman, G. L., Fiez, J. A., Corbetta, M.,
Buckner, R. L., Miezin, F. M., Raichle,
M. E., and Petersen, S. E. (1997).
Common blood flow changes across
visual tasks: II. Decreases in cere-
bral cortex. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 9,
648–663.
Smith, S. M., Fox, P. T., Miller, K. L.,
Glahn, D. C., Fox, M. P., Mackay,
C. E., Filippini, N., Watkins, K. E.,
Toro, R., Laird, A. R., and Beckmann,
C. F. (2009). Correspondence of the
www.frontiersin.org August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 295 | 11
Heine et al. Resting state networks and consciousness
brain’s functional architecture dur-
ing activation and rest. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106, 13040–13045.
Soddu, A., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Bahri,
M. A., Bruno, M. A., Boly, M.,
Demertzi, A., Tshibanda, J. F.,
Phillips, C., Stanziano, M., Ovadia-
Caro, S., Nir, Y., Maquet, P., Papa,
M., Malach, R., Laureys, S., and
Noirhomme, Q. (2012). Identifying
the default-mode component in spa-
tial IC analyses of patients with dis-
orders of consciousness. Hum. Brain
Mapp. 33, 778–796.
Soddu, A., Vanhaudenhuyse, A.,
Demertzi, A., Marie-Aurelie, B.,
Tshibanda, L., Di, H., Melanie,
B., Papa, M., Laureys, S., and
Noirhomme, Q. (2011). Resting
state activity in patients with disor-
ders of consciousness. Funct. Neurol.
26, 37–43.
Stamatakis, E. A., Adapa, R. M.,
Absalom, A. R., and Menon, D.
K. (2010). Changes in resting
neural connectivity during propo-
fol sedation. PLoS ONE 5, e14224.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014224
The Executive Committee of the Amer-
ican Psychological Association –
Division of Psychological Hypno-
sis. (1994). Definition and descrip-
tion of hypnosis.Contemp.Hypn. 11,
142–162.
Tian, L., Jiang, T., Liu, Y., Yu, C., Wang,
K., Zhou, Y., Song, M., and Li, K.
(2007). The relationship within and
between the extrinsic and intrinsic
systems indicated by resting state
correlational patterns of sensory
cortices. Neuroimage 36, 684–690.
Tohka, J., Foerde, K., Aron, A., Tom,
S., and Toga, A. (2008). Automatic
independent component labeling for
artifact removal in fMRI. Neuroim-
age 39, 1227–1245.
Tracey, I., and Mantyh, P. W. (2007). The
cerebral signature for pain percep-
tion and its modulation. Neuron 55,
377–391.
van den Heuvel, M. P., and Hulshoff
Pol, H. E. (2010). Exploring the
brain network: a review on resting-
state fMRI functional connectiv-
ity. Eur. Neuropsychopharmacol. 20,
519–534.
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Demertzi, A., Sch-
abus, M., Noirhomme, Q., Bredart,
S., Boly, M., Phillips, C., Soddu,
A., Luxen, A., Moonen, G., and
Laureys, S. (2011). Two distinct
neuronal networks mediate the
awareness of environment and
of self. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23,
570–578.
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Noirhomme, Q.,
Tshibanda, L. J., Bruno, M. A., Bover-
oux, P., Schnakers, C., Soddu, A.,
Perlbarg, V., Ledoux, D., Brichant,
J. F., Moonen, G., Maquet, P., Gre-
icius, M. D., Laureys, S., and Boly,
M. (2010). Default network con-
nectivity reflects the level of con-
sciousness in non-communicative
brain-damaged patients. Brain 133,
161–171.
Weissman, D. H., Roberts, K., Viss-
cher, K., and Woldorff, M. G. (2006).
The neural bases of momentary
lapses in attention. Nat. Neurosci. 9,
971–978.
Whitfield-Gabrieli, S., Moran, J. M.,
Nieto-Castanon, A., Triantafyllou,
C., Saxe, R., and Gabrieli, J. D.
(2011). Associations and dissoci-
ations between default and self-
reference networks in the human
brain. Neuroimage 55, 225–232.
Wiech, K., Lin, C. S., Brodersen, K. H.,
Bingel, U., Ploner, M., and Tracey,
I. (2010). Anterior insula integrates
information about salience into per-
ceptual decisions about pain. J. Neu-
rosci. 30, 16324–16331.
Zalesky,A., Fornito,A., and Bullmore, E.
(2012). On the use of correlation as
a measure of network connectivity.
Neuroimage 60, 2096–2106.
Zang, Y. F., He, Y., Zhu, C. Z.,
Cao, Q. J., Sui, M. Q., Liang,
M., Tian, L. X., Jiang, T. Z., and
Wang, Y. F. (2007). Altered base-
line brain activity in children with
ADHD revealed by resting-state
functional MRI. Brain Dev. 29,
83–91.
Zeman, A. (2001). Consciousness.Brain
124, 1263–1289.
Zuo, X. N., Di Martino, A., Kelly, C.,
Shehzad, Z. E., Gee, D. G., Klein,
D. F., Castellanos, F. X., Biswal, B.
B., and Milham, M. P. (2010). The
oscillating brain: complex and reli-
able. Neuroimage 49, 1432–1445.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
flict of interest.
Received: 01 April 2012; accepted: 28 July
2012; published online: 27 August 2012.
Citation: Heine L, Soddu A, Gómez F,
Vanhaudenhuyse A, Tshibanda L, Thon-
nard M, Charland-Verville V, Kirsch
M, Laureys S and Demertzi A (2012)
Resting state networks and consciousness
Alterations of multiple resting state net-
work connectivity in physiological, phar-
macological, and pathological conscious-
ness states. Front. Psychology 3:295. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00295
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Cognition, a specialty of Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2012 Heine, Soddu, Gómez,
Vanhaudenhuyse,Tshibanda,Thonnard,
Charland-Verville, Kirsch, Laureys and
Demertzi. This is an open-access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in other forums, provided
the original authors and source are cred-
ited and subject to any copyright notices
concerning any third-party graphics etc.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 295 | 12
